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We study the process of growth and business cycles in an open economy which
has access to international ¯nancial markets. The ¯nancial market imperfection
originates from costly state veri¯cation and a positive probability of default on
loans. The degree of credit market imperfection is endogenously derived. The
results show that developed economies are able to borrow on easier terms than
emerging countries. The credit market imperfection may cause some economies to
fall into a development trap if the initial endowment of capital is too low. The
¯nancial market frictions also generate interesting business cycle dynamics. Finan-
cial market imperfections help in replicating the empirical fact that output growth
shows positive autocorrelation at short horizons. The model also predicts that a
poorer economy will experience a more severe and persistent e®ect on investment
and output due to an exogenous shock.
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This paper develops a framework to study the role of credit market imperfections in the
process of growth and business cycles in an economy. Economists have long regarded the
credit market as key to understanding economic development and to transmitting cyclical
shocks through modern industrial economies.
The literature on the connection between credit markets and the macroeconomy
has developed in two directions. The growth branch of this literature started with Gur-
ley and Shaw([14]) who noted that economic growth is almost always accompanied by
¯nancial deepening, i.e., by more extensive use of external ¯nance in investment and the
gradual easing of distortions of the credit market. Subsequent papers in this literature
have focused on the role of credit markets as e±cient allocators of savings into produc-
tive investment opportunities. Bencivenga and Smith([3]) studied the growth e®ects of
¯nancial intermediation in an overlapping generation economy with agents characterized
by uncertain liquidity needs. Intermediation enhances growth because banks are e±cient
providers of liquidity which frees the individuals from the need to hold low yield liquid
assets. Greenwood and Jovanovic([12]) also derive similar results. For a summary of the
work in this area see Greenwood and Smith([13]).
The cyclical °uctuation branch of the literature focuses on the connection between
credit markets and business cycles. The main focus of attention is how the credit market
propagates and ampli¯es external shocks through the economy. This general sentiment
dates back to Fisher and, Friedman and Schwartz, who argued that adverse conditions
in ¯nancial markets may have worsened the e®ects of prewar recessions, including the
Great Depression. Much of business cycle research investigates the informational role
played by the credit markets. A seminal contribution in this line of research was made
by Brenanke and Gertler([4]). They developed a general equilibrium model where agency
costs arise endogenously. An important insight of their model is the theoretical possibility
that agency costs will enhance the propagation of productivity shocks. Carlstrom and
Fuerst([6]) built on the Bernanke-Gertler paper by constructing a computable general
equilibrium model. They try to quantitatively capture the e®ect of agency costs on
business cycles.
A related attempt to model credit market imperfection is provided by Keotaki andMoore([15]). They analyze the contracting problem between borrowers and lenders in an
environment where value of a project cannot be extracted by the lender due to inalien-
ability of human capital. The result is that borrowing is so tightly constrained by the
value of collateral that default never occurs in equilibrium.
We follow Bernanke-Gertler approach and adopt costly state veri¯cation model of
Townsend([17]). Our model di®ers from the earlier papers in the literature in three
important respects. Firstly, we study the e®ect of agency costs in an economy which
has access to international ¯nancial markets. Unlike Bernanke & Gertler, and Carlstrom
& Fuerst, the economy does not face an absolute borrowing constraint from domestic
savings. Secondly, the agency cost problem exists in the production of ¯nal good and
not in the production of intermediate goods alone. Finally, the inter-temporal preferences
are determined endogenously. This makes the evolution of the economy dependant on its
history. It also provides us with an insight as to why economies di®er in terms of their
credit market institutions over a long period of time.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the production tech-
nology and the interaction between investment and international credit market. The
inter-temporal optimization problem of the economy is presented in section 3. In section
4, we characterize the steady states and their stability properties. In section 5, we simulate
the behavior of an economy whose characteristics are similar to a standard real business
cycle economy and study the e®ect of exogenous shocks on it. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
A: The Production technology
Consider an economy with two production sectors. Both the production sectors produce
the same homogeneous product, which can be used for consumption or investment. For
tractability we will name the production sectors as household (H) and industrial (I). The
household sector of the economy is characterized by a simple but primitive technology,




where LH denotes the labor input and \a" denotes the marginal productivity of labor.
The industrial sector uses capital (K) and labor(L) simultaneously. Production in the
industrial sector can be thought of as a project or an endeavor to come up with a new
technology. If the project is successful then production is high but if the project is







F(LI) with probability ¼(KI)
0 with probability 1 ¡ ¼(KI)
(2)
where LI and KI are the amount of labor and capital inputs respectively. The probability
of success of the project is an increasing function of the amount of capital invested.
B: Industrial Sector Investment and the International credit market
The international credit market revolves around a risk free asset which yields a gross
return R¤ ¸ 1 which we will call the world interest rate. The international credit market
consists of a large number of potential lenders so all lenders on average earn R¤ on their
loans.
Let us begin with the case when an industrial sector ¯rm decides to borrow capital
from the international market. Suppose the ¯rm is endowed with K units of capital. The
¯rm has the option of investing in its own industrial sector project or the risk free asset. In
addition he can also borrow capital from international market at a lending rate of interest
Rl. The ¯rm can invest KI units of capital out of its endowment in the industrial sector
project and earn R¤ on the remaining capital. The amount KI is the owners equity in the
project and is observed by everyone. Suppose the ¯rm borrows B from the international
credit market. The ¯rm could in theory use BI for the industrial project and invest the
remaining amount in the risk free asset. This allocation of borrowed funds is not ex-ante
observed by the international lender.
The optimal contract between the ¯rm and the international lender is a standard
debt contract where the ¯rm repays the lender a gross interest rate of Rl on each unit
of borrowed capital if the ¯rm announces that the project was successful. If the agentannounces that the project was unsuccessful the lender must take over the project and
verify that the ¯rms's announcement was truthful. The takeover of project and subsequent
veri¯cation of the status of the project is essential to prevent strategic defaulting. Let the
veri¯cation cost to the lender on a loan size of B be mB1. On takeover of the project the
lender is able to retrieve the amount of borrowed capital, which the ¯rm had diverted into
the risk-free asset R¤(B ¡ BI). The limited liability clause in the debt contract prevents
the lender from attaching other sources the agent's income on the takeover of the project.









I) ¡ mB] = R
¤B . (3)
























Thus the economy can borrow capital from the international credit market as long
as they pay the break-even interest rate to the lenders Rl > R¤. Given the contractual
setup the only situation when the agent is going to declare bankruptcy is when the project
has been unsuccessful. The di®erence between the lending rate and the risk-free interest
rate is the interest premium. Let us now study the borrowing and investment decision of
the domestic agent.
Assumption 1: The functions F(.) and ¼(.) are increasing and strictly concave in their
arguments. In addition lim
L!0 F 0(:) = 1 , and lim
K!0 ¼0(:) = 1; where F 0(:) and ¼0(:) denote
the derivatives of functions F(:) and ¼(:) respectively.
Assumption 1 ensures some amount of investment in the industrial sector ¯rm is
worthwhile in the sense that it yields positive expected return.
Proposition 1 If the industrial sector ¯rm borrows in the international credit market
then the entire borrowing is invested in the industrial project.
Proof: See the appendix.
1This means that monitoring cost is constant for every unit of loan. We make this assumption as this
is the usual assumption in the literature. Relaxing this assumption however, will not alter our results











Proposition 2 The ¯rm will never borrow and lend simultaneously in the international
credit market. All debt contracts exhibit maximum equity participation i.e., KI = K.
Proof: See the appendix.
The intuition behind the above result is that the bene¯t to the ¯rm from investing
the entire capital in the project in terms of being able to borrow at a lower interest rate
outweighs the gain in income from the risk-free asset. Thus proposition 2 establishes
that the economy will save in the risk-free asset if it does not need to borrow from the












Having derived some basic results concerning the working of the credit market let us now
see how the aggregate economy behaves. Suppose the economy consists of a continuum of
identical industrial sector ¯rms of unit measure. The economy consists of a representative
agent who is endowed with L units of labor in every period. The agent invests his capital
equally among the industrial sector ¯rms and at the end of each period receives dividends
from the successful ¯rms. In each period ¼(:) proportion of the ¯rms will be successful.
The proportion of the successful ¯rms in each period depends on the amount of investment
in the industrial sector project. Depending on the amount of capital the agent brings into
period t the economy will either borrow or lend in the credit market. This decision will
in turn determine the inter-temporal budget constraint of the agent and then determine
the long run output of the economy. Let Kt denote the amount of capital brought into
period t by the agent. The aggregate production function of the economy is












Proposition 3 Let K¤ be solution to ¼0(K)F(LI) = R¤: If Kt 2 [0; K¤) then KI
t = Kt
and Bt > 0. If Kt 2 [ K¤;1) then KI
t · Kt and Bt = 0.
Proof: See the appendix.When the capital brought into period t by the agent is su±ciently small the agent will
borrow from the credit market. Also, from equation (6) we can see that if the capital
endowment of the agent is high the interest premium is lower. This corresponds well
with the fact that industrialized economies ¯nd it easier to borrow funds in comparison
to emerging economies. Once the return from investment in the industrial sector project
falls below the rate of return on the risk free asset the agent will become a lender in the
international credit market.
The domestic agent when faced with a lending rate Rl
t will borrow until
¼0(Kt + Bt)F(LI
t)




Equation (7)2implies the level of investment in the industrial project is decreasing in the
lending rate. The amount of investment in the industrial project when the agent has to
borrow from the international credit market is less than the ¯rst-best3.
In any period t; the agent also decides on the amount of labor and the capital to
employ in the industrial sector, and weather to borrow or lend in the international credit
market. From assumption 1, the optimal allocation of labor across the industrial and








t < L. Hence, LI
t is an increasing function of the amount of investment in the industrial
sector (KI
t +Bt). Let us write the labor employed in the industrial sector as LI(Kt+Bt).
From Proposition 3 we know that the economy will borrow if Kt < K¤ and the entire
capital stock will be invested in the industrial sector. Therefore from equation (7) we
can write Bt as a function of Kt. Once the economy attains K¤ units of capital it will
stop borrowing from the international credit market and invest any additional amount
of capital i.e., (Kt ¡ K¤) in the risk free asset. To save on notation, in the subsequent
analysis LI
t and Bt will refer to the optimal choice of labor and borrowing given the level
of capital.
2For detailed derivation of this condition see Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3.
3The ¯rst best level of investment will be given by the solution to ¼0(Kt +Bt)F(LI
t) = R¤. According





t > R¤ and
¼0(Kt+Bt)F(LI
t)
¼(Kt+Bt)+¼0(Kt+Bt)Bt < ¼0(Kt + Bt)F(LI
t), hence the level of investment is less than ¯rst best.Proposition 4 If Kt 2 [0; K¤) then total investment in the industrial sector is increasing
in Kt.
Proof: See the appendix.
When an economy is a borrower in the international credit market, the lending rate of
interest will decrease as the capital stock of the economy increases. As a result the level
of investment in the industrial sector increases with the level of capital.
3 Inter-temporal optimization
Now we study the inter-temporal problem faced by the economy. In order to ensure
the existence of at least one steady state equilibrium we assume the agent's preferences
are characterized by endogenous rate of time preference. One way of interpreting these
preferences is to view the discount factors as an agents probability of surviving to the next
period4. The agent given the initial endowment of capital, has to decide his consumption
and savings. The discount factor between periods t and t + 1(½t;t+1) is a continuous
function of consumption at time t in the following way:
½t;t+1 = ¯(Ct) (8)
where 0 < ¯(Ct) < 1.
Let the period utility function of the agent be U(Ct). The maximization problem























4For a detaled discussion of the preferences used below see Chakrabarty([7]).and a transversality condition
lim
t¡!1½0;tKt ¸ 0 . (TC)
At this point we make some assumptions concerning the functions U(:) and ¯(:) to ensure
that the necessary conditions for maximum are also su±cient.
Assumption 2: U(Ct) > 0, U0(Ct) > 0, U00(Ct) < 0, and ¯00(Ct) < 0 < ¯0(Ct) for all Ct.





R¤ + [1 ¡ ¼(Kt + Bt)]m if Kt 2 [0;Kh);
R¤ if Kt 2 [Kh;1):
The solution to the economy's optimization problem will satisfy the following di®erence
equations5.
U0(Ct) + ¯0(Ct) Át+1
¯(Ct)[U0(Ct+1) + ¯0(Ct+1) Át+2]
= ¯(Ct)Rt+1; (11)
Át = U(Ct) + ¯(Ct)Át+1 for all t ¸ 1; (12)
and (9). The variable Át+1 is the present discounted value of future consumption from
period t + 1 onwards6.









t=1 such that (9), (11), (12) and TC
hold for a given K0.
Equation (9) is the inter-temporal budget constraint of the agent. Equation (11) tells
us that the loss in welfare due to foregoing consumption in period t has to equal the
discounted value of gain in welfare from period t+1 onwards. This condition is commonly
referred to as the Fisher equation.




½t+1;sU(Cs)4 Steady-State Equilibria and Stability
Let us ¯rst study the steady state solutions to the di®erence equations (9), (11), (12) .
In a steady state, equations (9), (11) and (12)reduce to
C = Y (K) ¡ K , (BC)






where R(K) = maxfR¤ + [1 ¡ ¼(K + B)]m; R¤g. Equation (RR) is the steady state
counterpart of the Fisher's inter-temporal optimum. Equation (BC) gives us the locus
of points along which the agent's consumption and capital stock are constant and satisfy
the budget constraint. The (BC) curve is increasing in the level of capital7. The slope
of RR curve in consumption-capital plane is given by ¡
R0(K)¯(C)2
¯0(C) which is positive when
K 2 [0;K¤). When K 2 [K¤;1) the (RR) curve is a horizontal line. Now we characterize
the steady states and their stability properties.
Proposition 5 If ¯¡1( 1
R(0)) < Y (0) and ¯¡1( 1
R¤) > Y (K¤)¡K¤ then there exists at least
one steady state level of capital stock K 2 [0;K¤) which is locally unique.
Proof: See the appendix.
The proposition above establishes a su±cient condition for the existence of at least
one stable steady state equilibrium. The condition in the proposition means that when
an economy has no capital the discount factor should be su±ciently high to induce the
economy to save and accumulate capital. Note that it is possible that there may be more
than one stable steady state equilibria.
7Using the envelope theorem, the slope of BC curve is ¼0(K + B)Rl ¡ 1 if K 2 [0;K¤) and R¤ ¡ 1 if
K 2 [K¤;1): Hence the slope of the BC curve is always positive.5 Simulation
In this section we study the behavior of a simulated economy whose characteristics are
similar to a standard international business cycle model except for the credit market





; ¾ > 1,
¯(C) = ¯ ¡ (¯ ¡ ¯)e
¡±C; where ¯ > ¯ > 0 and ± > 0:




respectively. The probability of success of an industrial sector project is




¿(K + B)® if 0 < K + B < ¿¡ 1
®
1 if K + B > ¿¡ 1
®
where ¿ < 1. From the ¯rst-order condition for optimal allocation of labor, the amount







a )(K + B)
®
1¡µ if K < L;
L otherwise.
The level of capital when the economy starts lending in the international credit market
K¤ = ( c
R¤)
1¡µ
1¡®¡µ, where c = ®¿A(A¿µ
a )
µ
1¡µ. Note that as long as K¤ < ¿¡ 1
® the economy
which borrows from the international credit market will have to pay an interest premium.
These functional forms yield us a Cobb-Douglas production function for the industrial
sector. We now simulate the economy using certain parameter values which are presented
in Table 1. The relationship between capital stock of the economy and the lending rate is
given in Figure 1a. The corresponding optimal level of borrowing is shown in Figure 1b.
The solution to inter-temporal maximization problem of the economy shows the possibility
of two stable steady state equilibria. The function g(K) = ¯(Y (K)¡K)R(K)¡1 is shown
in ¯gure 2. If the initial endowment of capital of the economy is less than Ku the economy
converges to the poverty trap steady state Kp. If the initial endowment of capital exceeds
Ku the economy converges to the high level steady state Kh. Some characteristics of the
two steady states are summarized in Table 2. Understandably the poverty trap steadystate shows a lower share of industrial sector in GDP. The debt-equity ratio(B=K) is
higher for Kp. We now study the impact of a small productivity and interest rate shock
on these economies. These shocks are assumed to follow the following processes:
b R
¤
t = 0:9 b R
¤
t¡1 + ÀR;
b At = 0:95 b At¡1 + ÀA;
around their steady state values, where ÀR and ÀA are serially uncorrelated shocks to
world interest rate and productivity respectively.
The impulse response functions for capital and output due to a 1% productivity
shock are shown in Figures 3a and 3b. Both the steady state economies experience
ampli¯cation and persistence. This is due to the credit market friction. Figures 4a and
4b are the deviation in capital and output from their steady state values due to a 1%
shock to the world interest rate. Interestingly the e®ect on the poverty trap steady state
is more severe and persistent.
This behavior of the impulse response functions is similar to Carlstrom and Fuerst([6]).
However, in their model an economic expansion is associated with an increase in risk
premium and bankruptcy rates. Our model predicts a lowering of risk premium and
bankruptcy rates during periods of expansion. This is due to the fact that in our model
economies can borrow from the foreign markets and are not constrained my domestic
savings.
6 Conclusion
We develop a model of imperfect credit markets where an economy has access to foreign
capital markets and potentially can borrow unlimited amount of funds. On a purely
theoretical level this adds to the present literature by allowing the economy to borrow
beyond domestic savings. In conjunction with endogenous rate of time preference this
paper explains why history of an economy matters in the process of development. The
model also predicts hump shaped impulse response functions: a well established empirical
fact(see for example Cogley and Nason([8])).
In future work we would like to carefully calibrate the parameters of the model to
quantitatively evaluate the predictions of the model. In this paper we have played downthe role of the banking system. Explicit modeling of the banking system will not alter
our results as there is no aggregate uncertainty in the economy. Introduction of aggregate
uncertainty in the production process may lead to phenomenon such as banking crisis and
self ful¯lling expectations. The role of banking system would become important in such
a scenario. Such issues are left for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We want to show that if B > 0 then BI = B . If the ¯rm decides to borrow funds from











with respect to B and BI. If B > 0 and BI < B, then it is possible to increase the
expected income of the agent by reducing B since Rl > R¤ which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We want to show that if B > 0 then KI = K. Incorporating the previous proposition we








If B > 0 then ¼0(KI + B)[F(LI) ¡ RlB] ¡ ¼(KI + B) Rl ¸ 0. Suppose KI < K
then ¼0(KI + B)F(LI) = R¤. Substituting this in the previous inequality we get that
R¤ ¡RlB ¡¼(KI +B)Rl ¸ 0. Substituting (6) and carrying out simple manipulation we
get that for the B > 0 and KI < K to hold simultaneously ¡RlB ¡ [1 ¡ ¼(KI + B)]m
has to be non-negative which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The expected income of the domestic agent in period t is





















t > 0 from our assumptions and is increasing in (KI
t +Bt) as long as LI
t < L. Therefore
we can write LI
t = L(KI
t +Bt); where L0(:) > 0 if LI





0 implying borrowing will lower expected income. Hence Bt = 0 when Kt ¸ K¤. Using
Proposition 2, optimal choice of Bt after some manipulations can be written as
¼0(Kt + Bt)F(LI
t)
¼(Kt + Bt) + ¼0(Kt + Bt)Bt
¡ R
l
t ¸ 0 if Bt > 0:
Notice the ¯rst order condition for maximum is also su±cient since ¼00(Kt + Bt)[F(LI
t)¡
Rl
t] ¡ 2¼0(Kt + Bt)Rl








¼(Kt) ¡ R¤ > 0: Hence optimal Bt > 0:
Proof of Proposition 4:





0(Kt + Bt)Bt ¡ ¼(Kt + Bt)R
l
t = 0:











> ¡1. Therefore total investment Kt + Bt is in-
creasing in Kt.
Inter-temporal Optimization problem of the economy:




f½0;t U(Ct) + e ¸t[Yt ¡ Ct ¡ Kt+1]g :







U(Cs) = e ¸t ,
e ¸t = e ¸t+1Rt+1;








Át+1 , where Át+1 is the present discounted value of future consumption from period t+1
onwards. The ¯rst order conditions can now be re-written as
U
0(Ct) + ¯
0(Ct) Át+1 = ¸t , (14)¸t = ¸t+1¯(Ct)Rt+1, (15)
and
Kt+1 = Yt ¡ Ct . (16)
Substituting (14) in (15) we get,
U0(Ct) + ¯0(Ct) Át+1
¯(Ct)[U0(Ct+1) + ¯0(Ct+1) Át+2]
= ¯(Ct)Rt+1 (17)
Notice that the variable Át, the present discounted value of utilities from period t onwards,
evolves in the following fashion:
Át = U(Ct) + ¯(Ct) Át+1 for all t ¸ 1 . (18)
Proof of Proposition 5:
De¯ne g(K) = ¯(C)R(K) ¡ 1. Substituting (13) for C; g(0) = ¯(Y (0))R(0) ¡ 1 > 0 if
¯¡1( 1
R(0)) > Y (0) and g(K¤) = ¯(Y (K¤) ¡ K¤)R¤ ¡ 1 < 0 if ¯¡1( 1
R¤) < Y (K¤) ¡ K¤.
Then there must exist a Ks 2 [0;K¤) such that g(Ks) = 0. Moreover the derivative of the
function g(:) along that steady state is g0(Ks) = ¯0(C)R(Ks)(R(Ks)¡1)+¯(C)R0(Ks) < 0.
To study the stability properties of the steady state, we ¯rst log-linearize equation (9),
(12) and (11) around steady state which yields
c Kt+1 = ¯
¡1c Kt + s1 b Ct; (19)
where `^' denotes percentage deviation of the variable from its steady state value and
s1 = ¡C=K at steady state. Log-linearization of (12) gives us
b Át+1 = ¡ ¡ ¯
¡1¢2 b Ct + ¡¯











> 0 and ¢2 = (1 ¡ ¯)²U(C) +
¯²¯(C) > 0:We rewrite the above equation asb Át+2 ¡ b Át+1 = ¡¯
¡1¢2 b Ct+1 + ( ¯
¡1 ¡ 1) b Át+1; (21)
to simplify our analysis in future. From (14), we have

















s3 = 1 ¡ s2. We write the above equation more compactly as
¢1 b Ct + s3 b Át+1 = b ¸t; (22)
where ¢1 = [s2¾(C) + s3´¯(C)Á] < 0, from our previous assumptions.
From (15) we have
b ¸t ¡ b ¸t+1 = ²¯(C) b Ct + R
0(K)c Kt+1 (23)
We can now use equations (19), (20), (21), (22) and (23) to write a system of di®erence
equations in b Ct, b Át and c Kt where the dynamical system can be expressed as
2

















































The eigenvalues of matrix M are going to determine the local behavior of the system.
The roots of the polynomial det[M ¡ ¹I] = 0, will determine the behavior of the above
system.
det[M ¡ ¹I] = (¯
¡1 ¡ ¹)[(M11 ¡ ¹)(¯
¡1 ¡ ¹) + M12¯
¡1¢2 ¡ s1M13] .Therefore ¹1 = ¯¡1 is one of the roots of the polynomial. The other two roots of det[M ¡
¹I] are the roots of the polynomial,
P(¹) = ¹




Consider (M11¯¡1 + M12¯¡1¢2 ¡ s1M13) = ¯¡1
(
²¯+²¯(1¡¯¡1)+s1R0(K)K¡¢1+ ²¯(¯¡1¡1)¡s1R0(K)K
²¯¡¢1 ) = ¯¡1: Therefore P(0) = ¯¡1 > 1:
P(1) = 1¡M11¡¯¡1+¯¡1 = 1¡M11 =
²¯(¯¡1¡1)¡s1R0(K)K
²¯¡¢1 < 0 if ²¯(¯¡1¡1)¡s1R0(K)K <
0: Note that if g0(Ks) = ¯0(C)R(Ks)(R(Ks) ¡ 1) + ¯(C)R0(Ks) < 0 it implies that
²¯(¯¡1 ¡ 1) ¡ s1R0(K)K < 0. Hence there exists at least one root of the polynomial
det[M ¡¹I] which is less than one. Its easy to show that the third root is strictly greater
than unity in absolute value. Hence the steady state is a saddle path and locally unique.
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Press.Table 1: Simulation Parameters 
 







World interest rate(per annum) 
m  0.005  Average monitoring Cost 
t  0.1  Shift parameter for probability of success of 
industrial sector projects 
a  0.53  Elasticity of “probability of success” with 
respect to investment in the industrial sector 
q  0.26  Elasticity of output with respect to labor in the 
industrial sector 
A  34  Shift parameter in the industrial sector 
production function 







Lower bound of the discount factor 
_
b   
0.99 
 
Upper bound of the discount factor 
 
d  0.03  -[b¢¢(C)/b¢(C)] 




Table 2: Some steady state characteristics 
 

















Kp  70.22  75.93  17.64  77.39  0.89  1.10 
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